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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Hollie Winnett appeals from her judgment of conviction, challenging the district court's
denial of her motion to suppress. She argued in her Appellant's Brief that the district court erred
in denying her motion to suppress because it erred in concluding a probation search of a camper
at her new residence was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. The State argues in its
Respondent's Brief that the search was reasonable because it was reasonably related to
Ms. Winnett's probation violation. The State argues that, if the district court did err, the
appropriate remedy is to remand this case to the district court so that it can consider various
alternate grounds for suppression. Ms. Winnett submits this Reply Brief primarily to respond to
the State's request for remand.

Statement of Facts and Course of Proceedings
Ms. Winnett included a statement of facts and course of proceedings in her Appellant's
Brief, which she relies on and incorporates herein. (Appellant's Br., pp.1-4.)

1

ISSUE
Did the district court err in denying Ms. Winnett's motion to suppress?

2

ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred In Denying Ms. Winnett's Motion To Suppress
A.

The District Court Erred In Concluding A Probation Search Of A Camper At
Ms. Winnett's New Residence Was Reasonably Related To Her Probation Violation
Ms. Winnett argued in her Appellant's Brief that the district court erred in concluding a

probation search of a camper at her new residence was reasonably related to her disclosure that
she had changed her residence without permission, in violation of the terms of her probation.
(Appellant's Br., pp.6-9.) The State argues in its Respondent's Brief that the search of
Ms. Winnett's new residence and the camper at the residence "was reasonably related to her
probation violation ... because the officers needed to inspect and approve the new residence and
to confirm that she did, in fact, now reside at the new residence." (Respondent's Br., pp.11-12.)
The State does not cite any authority for this proposition, and does not attempt to distinguish the
cases Ms. Winnett relied on in her Appellant's Brief, specifically, State v. Santana, 162 Idaho 79
(Ct. App. 2017), and State v. Klingler, 143 Idaho 494 (2006). (Appellant's Br., pp.7-8.)
Moreover, the State's argument does not withstand logical scrutiny.
The probation officers confirmed Ms. Winnett was living at a new residence when they
were given that information by Ms. Winnett's daughter, by Ms. Winnett, and then by
Ms. Winnett's mother and stepbrother. The officers did not need to search the residence in order
to confirm Ms. Winnett had moved. Unlike in Santana and Klinger, the officers did not have
reasonable suspicion to believe Ms. Winnett was using drugs, and the offense for which
Ms. Winnett was on probation was not drug-related. Even if the officers could somehow justify a
search of Ms. Winnett's new residence, the officers had absolutely no basis to search the camper.
Ms. Winnett's mother told the officers that Ms. Winnett was not living in the camper, and the
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officers had no information to the contrary. (7/13/18 Tr., p.17, Ls.7-14.) The camper is not part
of the residence, and would not be included in the scope of a residence search.
The probation officers conducted their search of Ms. Winnett's new residence and the
camper at the residence in reliance on a Fourth Amendment waiver that the district court found
Ms. Winnett was not advised ofin open court. (7/30/18 Tr., p.6, L.23 - p.7, L.4.) The search was
not reasonably related to the disclosure or confirmation of a probation violation and thus was not
reasonable under the Fourth Amendment. See Santana, 162 Idaho at 85; see also United States v.
Knights, 534 U.S. 112, 121 (2001). The district court erred in concluding otherwise.

B.

If This Court Concludes The District Court Erred, The Proper Remedy Is For This Court
To Reverse The District Court's Order Denying Ms. Winnett's Motion To Suppress

The State asserts in its Respondent's Brief that, if this Court concludes the district court
erred in determining the search of a camper at Ms. Winnett's new residence was reasonable, "the
proper remedy is to remand to the district court for consideration of the remaining suppression
issues, including standing, the validity of Winnett's Fourth Amendment waiver, and whether
Winnett's brother gave valid consent." 1 (Respondent's Br., p.13.) In support of this assertion, the
State cites only one case, Hutchins v. State, 100 Idaho 661 (1979), which does not support its
position. It is clear from recent case law that, if this Court concludes the district court erred, the
proper remedy is for this Court to reverse the district court's order denying Ms. Winnett's motion
to suppress and remand this case to the district court for entry of an order granting Ms. Winnett' s
motion.

1

Notably, the State does not ask this Court to affirm under the "right-result, wrong-theory" rule.
See, e.g., State v. Hoskins, 165 Idaho 217,443 P.3d 231, 236-37 (2019) (discussing the rightresult, wrong-theory rule). Instead, the State asks only that the case be remanded for further
consideration of Ms. Winnett's motion to suppress. (Respondent's Br., pp.13-16.)
4

In a recent decision, State v. Hoskins, 165 Idaho 217,443 P.3d 231 (2019), the Idaho
Supreme Court "den[ied] the State's request that we remand this case for additional argument
and factual findings in lieu ofreversing the district court's denial of [the defendant's] motion to
suppress." 165 Idaho at_, 443 P.3d at 240. The Court explained:
At a suppression hearing, the State must carry its burden to demonstrate that the
search either fell within a well-recognized exception to the warrant requirement or
was otherwise reasonable under the circumstances. Here, the State tells us that the
proper exception is the plain-view theory. The State possessed the opportunity,
facts, and evidence to present this theory when the matter was originally before
the trial court. By its own admission, it failed to do this. Thus, the State did not
meet its burden to demonstrate the well-recognized exception which applied in
this case. Devising a "correct" theory for the first time on appeal does not give the
State a legal mulligan when it concedes that its original theory did not carry the
burden below.

Id. (quotation marks and citations omitted). The same reasoning applies in this case. The State
had the burden in the district court of presenting evidence and argument supporting the
warrantless search of the camper at Ms. Winnett's new residence. The State does not get a
second chance to present additional evidence and argument on standing, the validity of
Ms. Winnett's Fourth Amendment waiver, or whether Ms. Winnett's stepbrother gave valid
consent.

1.

Standing

The State asserts in its Respondent's Brief that it told the district court it had a "standing"
issue, and that it was "prevented from pursuing" that issue in the district court. (Respondent's
Br., p.16.) This is not entirely true. The State challenged Ms. Winnett's standing in the district
court, and the defense called Ms. Winnett's mother, Mary Pullin, to testify that Ms. Winnett was
indeed living with her at her residence when the search at issue occurred. (Tr., p.12, Ls.7-19.)
Counsel for Ms. Winnett argued, "I think that establishes the standing issue." (Tr., p.12, Ls.20-
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21.) The district court asked the prosecutor if he wanted to present any evidence as to standing
and it elected not to do so. (Tr., p.14, Ls.5-9.) The prosecutor argued, "it doesn't sound like she
has standing to contest what was found in the camper" because "[t ]here's been no evidence
proffered ... to show that she had any kind of right to privacy with materials found in the
camper." (Tr., p.14, Ls.14-19.) The district court said it disagreed, and the prosecutor said,
"Okay, I'm fine on the standing issue." (Tr., p.14, Ls.20-25.) At a subsequent hearing, the
prosecutor told the district court he wanted to file a motion to reconsider on standing, but he did
not actually file a motion. (7/13/18 Tr., p.65, Ls.7-9.) The State contested Ms. Winnett's standing
in the district court, and the district court concluded Ms. Winnett had standing to challenge the
search of the camper. The State should not now be given another opportunity to challenge
Ms. Winnett' s standing.

2.

Fourth Amendment Waiver

The State asserts in its Respondent's Brief that the district court "did not rule on the
validity of Winnett's Fourth Amendment waiver." (Respondent's Br., p.8.) But the State
acknowledges that the district court found "persuasive" the Court of Appeals' holding in Santana
that "if a Fourth Amendment waiver was not signed in open court or if the sentencing court fails
to orally advise the defendant of those rights, there is no Fourth Amendment waiver."
(Respondent's Br., p.9 (quoting 7/30/18 Tr., p.6, L.23 - p.7, L.4.).) The State also acknowledges
that, like in Santana, the district court decided Ms. Winnett' s motion to suppress without relying
on the Fourth Amendment waiver. (Respondent's Br., p.10.) The State had the opportunity to
argue in the district court that Ms. Winnett validly waived her Fourth Amendment rights as a
condition of her probation, and in fact submitted her agreement of supervision to the district
court to consider with respect to the suppression motion. (See State's Ex. 2.) The district court
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did not agree with the State that Ms. Winnett waived her Fourth Amendment rights, and the State
should not be given another opportunity to argue the issue.

3.

Consent

The State also asks this Court to remand this case to the district court so that the district
court "can decide the consent issue." (Respondent's Br., p.16.) The State points out that the
district court recognized that Ms. Winnett's brother consented to the search of the camper.
(Respondent's Br., p.16.) Notably, however, the State never argued in the district court that the
search of the camper was valid because of the stepbrother's consent. (See generally R., pp.8394.) And the State did not present any evidence that the stepbrother possessed common authority
or other sufficient relationship to the camper to make his consent valid. See State v. Barker, 136
Idaho 728, 730 (2002) (discussing the consent exception to the warrant requirement). The State
had the burden of presenting evidence in the district court supporting the warrantless search of
the camper, and never argued consent. As our Supreme Court said in Hoskins, it "has placed a
premium on counsel presenting the facts and law that it chooses to support its position in the trial
court." 165 Idaho at_, 443 P.3d at 240 (citation omitted). The State did not argue the consent
exception below, and should not be allowed to make that argument for the first time following
this appeal.
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CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated above, as well as those set forth in her Appellant's Brief,
Ms. Winnett respectfully requests that the Court vacate her conviction, reverse the district court's
order denying her motion to suppress, and remand this case to the district court for further
proceedings.
DATED this 10th day of September, 2019.
I sf Andrea W. Reynolds
ANDREA W. REYNOLDS
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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